2289 reduced low-skilled job opportunities, excluding much of the local workforce from the benefits associated with mining activity (5_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). Coordination failures in Chumbivilcas are closely linked to the selective withdrawal of the State from its planning and coordinating roles. Interviews describe a governance regime operating under a logic where the State prioritizes revenue collection and security management through prolonged states of emergency, while renouncing territorial planning and allowing competition for resources to unfold without an overarching framework (1_LI_EN_EXP_M.docx). Institutional responses rely heavily on the continuous renegotiation of hundreds of unmet commitments, generating a cycle in which unresolved problems are repeatedly reframed as new demands (4_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). Weak local bureaucracies, marked by high staff turnover and limited technical capacity, further constrain municipalities’ ability to act as effective counterparts to mining companies, reinforcing a governance arrangement dominated by bilateral negotiations and private agreements (6_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). In this context, informational asymmetries persist, enabling external investors and processing plant operators to capture segments of the local mining ecosystem, while the absence of a coherent state-led vision prevents the consolidation of sustained coordination across scales and actors. Therefore, governance dynamics observed in Chumbivilcas point to a configuration that remains dominated by transactional and fragmented coalitional arrangements, despite the presence of localized forms of agency. The absence of a coordinating State role, combined with persistent informational asymmetries and competing extractive logics, constrains the emergence of coalitions capable of redefining rules, responsibilities, and long-term development priorities. In this context, governance is sustained through a patchwork of bilateral agreements and reactive responses to conflict, which may provide short-term stability but ultimately reproduce fragmentation and unequal power relations. Although interviews reveal growing recognition of these limitations and increasing demands for more predictable and redistributive arrangements, these aspirations have yet to coalesce into a shared territorial vision or a stable coalition oriented toward transformative change. 4.3. Espinar According to the interviewees, the governance in Espinar is structured around a more mature and centralized configuration where the central institutional pillar of this arrangement is the Convenio Marco, established in 2003 as a pioneering mechanism through which the mining company committed to transfer 3% of its pre-tax profits, or a fixed annual mínimum, to the province as a whole, rather than to individual districts (5_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). This provincial-scale agreement has positioned Espinar as a reference point within the SMC, while also concentrating governance and political negotiation in the urban center of Yauri, which functions as the main hub for institutional, economic, and social relations linked to mining activity (6_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). Despite this higher degree of institutionalization, governance in Espinar continues to operate largely under a crisis-management logic. Interviews indicate that, as in other parts of the corridor, the State has normalized the use of states of emergency as a mechanism to contain conflict, while dialogue platforms tend to intervene only at critical moments without ensuring the sustained implementation of agreed commitments (1_LI_EN_EXP_M.docx). Over time, the governance architecture associated with the Convenio Marco has itself evolved in ways that reveal underlying tensions. Originally conceived as a development-oriented instrument, it has increasingly been used to finance direct cash transfers and population-wide “bonuses”, particularly following the pandemic. While this shift has not formally replaced its project-based design, it has progressively reoriented expectations and practices, reinforcing a more monetized understanding of compensation among local actors and residents. (3_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx; 4_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). At the same time, Espinar exhibits distinctive features that differentiate it from other provinces, including a stronger technical capacity among local leaders to demand participatory environmental monitoring in response to decades of accumulated impacts, and the emergence of new local actors, such as the Chamber of Commerce in Yauri (6_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx), who seek to reposition governance debates beyond the traditional binary between the municipality, the company, and community organizations. Governance tensions in Espinar are shaped by a distinctive combination of accumulated environmental grievances, institutional saturation, and the progressive monetization of social demands. According to interviewees, conflict in Espinar is anchored in decades of documented environmental impacts
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