2290 dating back to the Tintaya period, which has transformed uncertainty over future risks into demands for redress of proven damages (1_LI_EN_EXP_M.docx; 5_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx; 6_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). This historical trajectory has contributed to a governance setting in which local actors have progressively strengthened their technical capacity to engage in participatory monitoring and oversight. At the same time, limited clarity regarding remediation timelines continues to shape perceptions of uncertainty and underscores the importance of sustained transparency to build longer-term trust (4_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). On the other hand, another source of tension is the widespread demand for direct cash transfers (“bonos”), which has progressively captured the resources of the Convenio Marco and shifted its original development-oriented logic toward short-term redistribution (3_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx; 4_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). As we have explained, the governance dynamics in Espinar reveal a configuration that combines relatively high institutionalization with persistent constraints on transformative coalition-building. The existence of a province-wide Convenio Marco, accumulated technical capacity among local actors, and more structured arenas for environmental monitoring suggest conditions that are more conducive to coordinated governance than in other parts of the SMC. However, these assets are counterbalanced by a governance logic that remains largely crisis-driven and increasingly monetized, where redistributive bargaining through direct cash transfers has come to dominate collective expectations. The progressive saturation of institutional mechanisms, compounded by fragmented state leadership and unresolved historical grievances, limits the ability of existing arrangements to move beyond transactional coordination. As a result, while Espinar exhibits elements of stability and institutional maturity, prevailing coalitional dynamics continue to prioritize short-term compensation and conflict containment over the reconfiguration of rules, roles, and long-term territorial development pathways, constraining the emergence of a fully transformative governance coalition. Across the three cases, a set of recurrent governance patterns becomes evident despite their institutional differences. First, coordination remains fragmented and largely reactive, with state interventions centered on crisis management rather than long-term territorial planning. Second, informational asymmetries and weakly institutionalized knowledge systems limit the possibility of building shared diagnoses and sustained collective action. Third, prevailing governance arrangements tend to prioritize short-term compensation and transactional bargaining over the reconfiguration of rules, roles, and responsibilities. Together, these dynamics constrain the emergence of transformative coalitions, even in contexts where institutional mechanisms are more developed. These patterns are not only descriptive but also generative, as they directly inform the design logic of the OTT. In particular, the observatory responds to the absence of shared and credible information infrastructures, the lack of sustained and rule-based interaction spaces, and the limited temporal horizon of existing governance arrangements. Rather than emerging as an abstract proposal, the OTT can thus be understood as a governance-oriented platform grounded in the empirical observation of these recurring coordination failures, seeking to create the conditions under which more sustained and potentially transformative forms of territorial governance may emerge. 5. CONCLUSIONS: REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNANCE, COALITIONS AND JUST ENERGY TRANSITION This article examined how different governance configurations shape territorial responses to largescale copper extraction in the context of the global energy transition, drawing on comparative evidence from the SMC in Peru. The cases analyzed highlight how distinct institutional arrangements mediate similar structural pressures associated with critical mineral extraction. Cotabambas illustrates the high costs of reactive governance, where crisis management, exceptional measures, and fragmented authority reproduce conflict and foreclose long-term coordination. Chumbivilcas reveals the limits of bilateral and decentralized arrangements: while community agency and local experimentation are more visible, the absence of a coordinating framework enables fragmentation, parallel power structures, and competitive extraction dynamics. Espinar, in contrast, demonstrates that higher institutionalization and redistributive mechanisms do not automatically translate into transformative governance. Across the corridor, these variations underscore a common pattern: when governance relies primarily on emergency responses, compensation, or localized bargaining, it may secure short-term operability but remains ill-equipped to align critical mineral extraction with the longer-term social and territorial objectives implied by a just energy transition. A central implication of this analysis is that the governance of critical minerals cannot be reduced to the management of conflict or the redistribution of extractive rents, but requires institutional arrangements
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