such as the Informe Técnico Sustentatorio (ITS) are perceived as fast-track administrative tools that weaken participatory safeguards, while the recurrent use of states of emergency has become normalized as a mechanism to manage social conflict and secure mining operations. Dialogue platforms, particularly dialogue tables, are widely regarded as short-term, crisis-driven arrangements that lack institutional anchoring and effective follow-through, thereby failing to address the structural drivers of conflict (1_LI_EN_EXP_M.docx). This reactive logic is reinforced by a highly fragmented institutional architecture, marked by the proliferation of informal or weakly institutionalized roles (such as the figure of the Alto Comisionado) and by a cumulative cycle of unfulfilled commitments that generates renewed disputes and further negotiation rounds without durable resolution (4_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). Within this context, the State is perceived to have partially withdrawn from its coordinating and planning functions, effectively delegating governance to interactions between the mining company and local actors. As a result, corporate actors assume de facto technical authority over development priorities and project implementation, producing relations of dependence and further constraining the emergence of coordinated, territorially grounded governance arrangements (6_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). Governance failures in Cotabambas are reinforced by a set of interlocking tensions and coordination breakdowns that have accumulated over time, generating persistent mistrust and fragmentation among actors. A central source of tension stems from late-stage decisions taken without adequate technical assessment or participatory processes, most notably the substitution of the original mineroduct by road-based transport. Interviewees describe this shift as a critical rupture that intensified environmental grievances related to dust, noise, and constant traffic, while also deepening divisions among communities, between those seeking to integrate into the mining economy as service providers and those prioritizing the protection of agricultural livelihoods (1_LI_EN_EXP_M.docx; 5_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). Coordination failures are closely tied to the way information and decision-making are managed. Administrative instruments such as the ITS are repeatedly cited as fast-track mechanisms that authorize substantial operational changes while bypassing meaningful citizen participation, reinforcing perceptions of opacity and exclusion (1_LI_EN_EXP_M.docx). Participatory processes associated with Environmental Impact Assessments are similarly described as procedurally weak and substantively ineffective, undermining their legitimacy as spaces for deliberation (3_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). In the absence of transparent and cumulative information, expectations linked to mining revenues, employment, and urban development remain misaligned with actual outcomes, producing a recurrent cycle in which longstanding problems. Taken together, these dynamics suggest that Cotabambas remains structurally distant from a transformative coalition logic. Governance is currently dominated by defensive and transactional arrangements oriented toward crisis containment, operational continuity, and the management of immediate pressures, rather than toward the reconfiguration of rules, roles, and decision-making processes. Key conditions associated with transformative coalitions, such as table coordination mechanisms, shared and credible information infrastructures, and an extended temporal horizon for collective action are largely absent. In this sense, Cotabambas illustrates a context in which the conditions for transformation are increasingly recognized but remain politically and institutionally underdeveloped, constraining the emergence of coalitions oriented toward longer-term territorial change. 165
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