fragmentation and unequal power relations. Although interviews reveal growing recognition of these limitations and increasing demands for more predictable and redistributive arrangements, these aspirations have yet to coalesce into a shared territorial vision or a stable coalition oriented toward transformative change. 4.3. Espinar According to the interviewees, the governance in Espinar is structured around a more mature and centralized configuration where the central institutional pillar of this arrangement is the Convenio Marco, established in 2003 as a pioneering mechanism through which the mining company committed to transfer 3% of its pre-tax profits, or a fixed annual mínimum, to the province as a whole, rather than to individual districts (5_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). This provincial-scale agreement has positioned Espinar as a reference point within the SMC, while also concentrating governance and political negotiation in the urban center of Yauri, which functions as the main hub for institutional, economic, and social relations linked to mining activity (6_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). Despite this higher degree of institutionalization, governance in Espinar continues to operate largely under a crisis-management logic. Interviews indicate that, as in other parts of the corridor, the State has normalized the use of states of emergency as a mechanism to contain conflict, while dialogue platforms tend to intervene only at critical moments without ensuring the sustained implementation of agreed commitments (1_LI_EN_EXP_M.docx). Over time, the governance architecture associated with the Convenio Marco has itself evolved in ways that reveal underlying tensions. Originally conceived as a development-oriented instrument, it has increasingly been used to finance direct cash transfers and population-wide “bonuses”, particularly following the pandemic. While this shift has not formally replaced its project-based design, it has progressively reoriented expectations and practices, reinforcing a more monetized understanding of compensation among local actors and residents. (3_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx; 4_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). At the same time, Espinar exhibits distinctive features that differentiate it from other provinces, including a stronger technical capacity among local leaders to demand participatory environmental monitoring in response to decades of accumulated impacts, and the emergence of new local actors, such as the Chamber of Commerce in Yauri (6_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx), who seek to reposition governance debates beyond the traditional binary between the municipality, the company, and community organizations. Governance tensions in Espinar are shaped by a distinctive combination of accumulated environmental grievances, institutional saturation, and the progressive monetization of social demands. According to interviewees, conflict in Espinar is anchored in decades of documented environmental impacts dating back to the Tintaya period, which has transformed uncertainty over future risks into demands for redress of proven damages (1_LI_EN_EXP_M.docx; 5_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx; 6_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). This historical trajectory has contributed to a governance setting in which local actors have progressively strengthened their technical capacity to engage in participatory monitoring and oversight. At the same time, limited clarity regarding remediation timelines continues to shape perceptions of uncertainty and underscores the importance of sustained transparency to build longer-term trust (4_LI_EP_EXP_M.docx). On the other hand, another source of tension is the widespread demand for direct cash transfers (“bonos”), which has progressively captured the resources of the Convenio Marco and shifted its 167
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