Model 1: Community Legal Equity Fund (Compulsory Pre-Funded Model) The most transformative and structurally robust solution. Modelled directly on the environmental rehabilitation guarantee funds that mining companies are already required to establish in South Africa and many other jurisdictions, this model applies the same logic to social liabilities. Mechanism: Every mining operation with any potential to cause physical or economic displacement, including during future mine expansions, would be legally required to contribute a prescribed percentage of projected resettlement costs into an independently administered Community Legal Equity Fund. The fund would be governed by a board of trustees with no legal affiliation to the mining company, comprising representatives nominated by affected communities, independent legal professionals, and a government regulator. Affected households and community organisations would apply directly to the fund for legal representation and technical advisory support. The company would have no role in approving or denying applications, and no visibility into specific legal strategies funded. Positives: Structural independence from company; predictable resourcing; communities access support as of right; aligns with established ‘polluter pays’ principles; auditable. Caution: Requires legislative mandate; governance design must prevent elite capture within communities; actuarial methodology needed for fund-sizing; may face industry resistance Table 3 – Model 2: Statutory Legal Aid Extension with Industry Levy Model 2: Statutory Legal Aid Extension with Industry Levy A state-level solution that leverages existing legal aid infrastructure while requiring the mining sector to finance community legal services for resettlement cases Mechanism: National governments would extend the mandate of public legal aid institutions to include mining resettlement cases as a designated priority category. A statutory industry levy, calculated as a proportion of annual royalties, mining right application fees, or corporate income tax from mining operations, would fund a dedicated resettlement legal aid programme. Affected households and communities would access services through the legal aid institution, which would manage conflicts of interest and case allocation independently. This model has analogues in environmental legal aid programmes in several jurisdictions. Positives: Builds on existing institutions; state-administered which reduces governance risk; creates legal entitlement for communities; politically tractable as an extension of existing obligations Caution: Depends on state capacity; legal aid institutions may lack specialist mining resettlement expertise; requires ring-fencing to prevent levy funds from disappearing into general government budgets. Table 4 – Model 3: Multilateral Conditionality 113
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