Track 8: Safety, Social Performance and Talent Management

JSAs and frontline checks are frequently underpinned by assumptions that are not made explicit to users. Where the tools have not been developed with human-centred design principles, templates tend to start blank, provide limited scaffolding from higher-level analyses, and do not surface the specific controls that matter most for the task at hand. Frontline processes labelled as risk assessments often function as verification steps, yet without clear intent or reliable inputs they may focus on low-consequence hazards while under-testing the controls that prevent single or multiple fatalities. The cumulative effect is that supervisors and crews lack timely, task-relevant information about control status, investigations struggle to drive visible updates to improve control effectiveness, and governance signals drift toward activity counts rather than evidence that critical controls are present and functioning where work occurs. Across these cases, uncertainty about storage location, access pathways, and version currency is a consistent contributor: without a single, authoritative source in the tools supervisors actually use, frontline confidence in “what is current” remains fragile. 7. PRACTICAL OUTPUT: DECISION-POINT QUESTIONS TO USE BACK AT SITE The purpose is to equip leaders with practical questions that surface design decisions and test whether the system consistently delivers what matters most to the point of work: clear, task relevant visibility of critical controls that prevent fatal and severe harm, and confidence that those controls are in place and functioning before work begins. 1.​ Role clarity & competency Is it straightforward for supervisors and frontline workers to know exactly which controls/critical controls they own, what “effective” looks like for each? 2.​ Risk criteria & like for like responses Do current risk definitions and matrices produce consistent escalation for fatal and severe harm across sites and functions (no matter which tool is used), so that like for like risks receive like for like responses? 3.​ Integration of health and safety with operations Whether safety and health are integrated or deliberately separate, are there defined pathways that ensure exposure controls, monitoring results, and investigation learnings flow into operational planning, permits, and prestart briefings in language that supervisors and crews can act on? 4.​ Single source of truth for critical controls Where do critical controls “live” (risk register, safety system, work management, operational planning), what is the single source of truth, and are identifiers stable and consistent so verification evidence can be traced from the field to governance without re translation? How is this source made visible inside the tools supervisors actually use? 5.​ Frontline information before work starts What specific, area relevant information reaches supervisors about material unwanted events, the controls that matter most for today’s tasks, who verifies them, the time stamp of last verification, and where evidence is stored? Is the information pulled from a single, current, repository and presented in a format accessible at the point of work (not buried in multiple systems)? 6.​ Design of task-based tools (JSA) 17

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